Miscellaneous by Wall, Donald J.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The court next considered the amount of the fine that may
be imposed on an unincorporated association. Looking to the
civil contempt statutes, it held that section 295.1472 required
the fine in this case to be limited to two hundred fifty dollars
plus costs and expenses, since there was no showing of actual
damages. The court, however, opened the door to the possibil-
ity that in an appropriate case, the dollar limit set by section
295.14 could be found to be an invalid restriction on the inher-
ent power of a court to punish for contempt. It was stated that
the legislature may regulate the power to punish for contempt
but "may not diminish it so as to render it ineffectual."73 The
court ruled that to exceed the statutory maximum, there must
be a specific trial court finding that the contempt power would
be rendered ineffectual. Since there was no such finding in
Kenosha Unified, the statutory limit precluded imposition of
a greater fine.
MARY F. WYANT
MISCELLANEOUS
1. OPEN MEETING LAW
In State ex rel. Lynch v. Conta,' the Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld the applicability of Wisconsin's open meeting
law2 to closed sessions of a state legislative committee where it
was questionable whether those members in attendance, all of
whom were from a single political party, acted in the capacity
of a political caucus or a legislative body. This case was an
original action for declaratory relieP challenging the legality of
72. Wis. STAT. § 295.14 (1973):
If an actual loss or injury has been produced to any party by the misconduct
alleged, the court shall order a sufficient sum to be paid by the defendant to
such party to indemnify him and to satisfy his costs and expenses, instead of
imposing a fine upon such defendant; and in such case the payment and accept-
ance of such sum shall be an absolute bar to any action by such aggrieved party
to recover damages for such injury or loss. Where no such actual loss or injury
has been produced the fine shall not exceed two hundred and fifty dollars over
and above the costs and expenses of the proceedings.
73. 70 Wis. 2d at 335, 234 N.W.2d at 316.
1. 71 Wis. 2d 662, 239 N.W.2d 313 (1976).
2. Wis. STAT. § 66.77 (1973).
3. The court discussed at some length the propriety of rendering a declaratory
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two secret meetings conducted by members of the Wisconsin
Legislature's Joint Committee on Finance.
This committee was composed of fourteen senators and
representatives-eleven of whom were Democrats, the remain-
der being Republicans. The purpose of the committee was to
recommend a budget bill to the legislature governing the ap-
propriation of funds to state departments. To gather informa-
tion to accomplish this responsibility, the committee held
numerous public hearings receiving public testimony on fund-
ing and department allocation. Except for the two meetings in
question here, all executive sessions had been preceded by full
notice to the public, committee members, and other interested
departmental agencies and groups.
The bill underwent several changes resulting in an amended
version (ultimately being passed by both houses). While the
bill was still before the committee the eleven Democrats held
a private meeting, no notice being given to the minority Repub-
lican members, nor to the public. Members of the legislative
fiscal bureau attended and reported on the finances of certain
state agencies. The recollection of those committee members in
attendance raised a question as to what actually transpired -
some recalled that just questioning of the reporting bureau
occurred while others recalled partisan views also being ex-
changed. At a second meeting the only persons in attendance
were seven Democrats, members of the legislative finance bu-
reau and an administrative department employee. It was stipu-
lated by those in attendance at this meeting that their intent
was to discuss and review party policy and strategy relevant to
the items under discussion.
The general mandate of Wisconsin's open meeting law
states that "[n]o discussion of any matter shall be held and
no action of any kind, formal or informal, shall be introduced,
deliberated upon, or adopted by a governmental body in a
judgment. The opinion noted that those in the position of the district attorney-
petitioner have an adequate forum in the normal enforcement action for the proposed
construction of a law, while it is those without such recourse who must rely upon the
declaratory judgment. The court, however, held that because the parties were, in fact,
adversaries and since the respondents could have brought this suit as petitioners and
did not protest the converse form, the suit was not dismissed. This was done although
the court was cognizant of the generally accepted rule that a proper case for a declara-
tory judgment concerning a penal law is presented only by the request of the party
threatened by application of the sanctions of the law involved.
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closed session"4 except under certain specified circumstances.'
The question asked of the court was under what circumstances
do members of the state legislature and its various committees
fall within the scope of the open meeting law. The court an-
swered that the law applied at the point of bringing the govern-
mental body to its collective existence such that "the body is
vested with authority, power, duties or responsibilities not
vested in the individual members."8
The court sought some method to reach those members of
a governmental body who would fail to follow the formalities
of convening a competent body. This problem was addressed
by the legislature in the preamble to the law: "The intent of
this section is that the term 'meeting' or 'session' as used in this
section shall not apply to any social or chance gathering or
conference not designed to avoid this section. " The court rec-
ognized the intent of the legislature to extend the ban on se-
crecy to more than formal metings convened for the transaction
of official business. Otherwise, formal meetings could become
merely a ceremonial acceptance of secret decisions. At the
same time, the court warned that the imposition of the open
session requirements on all government business discussions
between at least two members of the same body would seriously
impede the preliminary effort involved in government action
and thus be incompatible with the necessary conduct of gov-
ernmental affairs and the transaction of governmental busi-
ness.
8
The court took a liberal view in determining what circum-
stances required compliance with the open meeting mandate.
The open meeting law was held applicable to members of a
governmental body in three situations: (1) when the full mem-
4. Wis. STAT. § 66.77(3) (1973).
5. Eight exceptions have been enumerated in § 66.77(4).
6. Wis. STAT. § 66.77(2)(b) (1973). See also Wis. STAT. § 66.77(3) (1973).
7. WIS. STAT. § 66.77(1) (1973) (emphasis added).
8. 71 Wis. 2d at 689, 239 N.W.2d at 332. A full reading of § 66.77 (1) suggests such
an admonition:
66.77 Open meetings of governmental bodies. (1) In recognition of the fact
that a representative government of the American type is dependent upon an
informed electorate, it is declared to be the policy of this state that the public
is entitled to the fullest and most complete information regarding the affairs of
government as is compatible with the conduct of government affairs and the
transaction of governmental business. The intent of this section is that the term
"meeting" or "session" as used in this section shall not apply to any social or
chance gathering or conference not designed to avoid this section.
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bership is present; (2) when a quorum exists; and (3) when one-
half the membership, a so-called "negative quorum", is pres-
ent. A failure to meet the open session requirements would
result in the presumption that such gatherings were intended
or designed to avoid the law, though participants at these con-
ferences might rebut the presumption by demonstrating that
no evasion of the open meeting law was intended.'
While Justice Hansen agreed in his dissent with the court's
conclusions, he felt the court did not go far enough. Given an
"intent to avoid" and the ability to influence or control
decisionmaking, Justice Hansen would have also proscribed
meetings of less than one-half of the members of a legislative
committee or governmental body. 10
Although the court found the open meeting law applicable
to the joint finance committee, the court also determined that
the two meetings under consideration herein did not evade the
law. The law itself provides for certain exceptions to its general
open session requirement." Reliance was placed upon subsec-
tion (4) (g) which provides an exemption for "partisan cau-
cuses" of members of the state legislature. As for legislative
committees, where those persons participating in a closed com-
mittee meeting belong to a single political party, their secret
gathering becomes a "partisan caucus," exempted from the
anti-secrecy requirements.1 2 Since the two meetings challenged
were attended solely by members of one political party, and no
restrictions were placed on the matters that could be addressed
at such caucuses, the court found the two closed sessions ex-
empt from the purview of the open meeting law.
The conclusion that can be drawn from the court's decision
is that partisan state legislative committee members may hold
secret meetings in advance of the public session of such legisla-
tive committee so long as no one from another party is invited
to or in attendance at the closed session.
9. 71 Wis. 2d at 685-86, 239 N.W.2d at 330-31.
10. Id. at 703, 239 N.W.2d at 339. The majority itself conceded that:
It is certainly possible that the appearance of a quorum could be avoided by
separate meetings of two or more groups, each less than quorum size, who agree
through mutual representatives to act and vote uniformly, or by a decision by a
group of less than quorum size which has the tacit agreement and acquiescence
of other members sufficient to reach a quorum.
Id. at 687, 239 N.W.2d at 331.
11. Wis. STAT. § 66.77(4) (1973).
12. 71 Wis. 2d at 692-94, 239 N.W.2d at 334.
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The dissent found this possibility startling in view of Wis-
consin's constitutional mandate against secrecy at any stage of
the law-making process of the state legislature "except when
the public welfare shall require secrecy."' 3 Exceptions from
such constitutional insistence upon openness may not be legis-
latively created or judicially upheld except where required for
public welfare.
A key to the possible constitutional infirmity of a blanket
exemption of "partisan caucuses" from the requirement of
openness rests upon the interpretation given to the word
"caucus". 4 Justice Robert Hansen, in his dissent, would not
accept the court's liberal construction of the partisan caucus
exemption. The gathering of members of a single party on a
committee could not be for the purpose of determining the
party policy for their party colleagues in the senate or assem-
bly. Such a gathering could only discuss what a particular
committee would do. The action here was confined to the com-
mittee itself, rather than broad party policy.' 5 Justice Hansen
would interpret the partisan caucus exemption to refer solely
to the "traditional and institutionalized party caucuses com-
posed of all members of a political party in the assembly, in
the state senate, or, on occasion, in the two houses."'I6 The basis
for his construction lay in the fact that such a construction
furthered the purpose of the open meeting law yet stayed
within the bounds of the state constitution. Justice Hansen
reasoned:
If three members of a five person legislative committee can,
assuming they belong to the same party, meet in secret to
determine what the committee is to do when it meets in
public, the exemption as to a "partisan caucus" is broadened
to where public business can be transacted in secrecy. This
13. WIS. CONST. art. IV § 10:
Journals; open doors; adjournments. SECTION 10. Each house shall keep a
journal of ts proceedings and publish the same, except such parts as require
secrecy. The doors of each house shall be kept open except when the public
welfare shall require secrecy. Neither house shall, without consent of the other,
adjourn for more than three days.
14. An accepted and widely used dictionary defines the word thusly: "[A] closed
meeting of a group of persons belonging to the same political party or faction [usually]
to select candidates or to decide on policy." WEBSTER'S, SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY, BASED ON WEBSTER'S, THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1967).
15. 71 Wis. 2d at 706, 239 N.W.2d at 340.
16. Id. at 707, 239 N.W.2d at 341.
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is contrary to the constitutional mandate and purpose of the
statute.'
One important provision of the open meeting law which the
court found unnecessary to the determination of this action was
the broad phraseology contained in section 66.77(3)8 deeming
"voidable" any action taken at a meeting held in violation of
the open meeting requirements. The court regarded this provi-
sion of the statute as unclear, though it did state that the
legislature meant only "tangible actions can be . ..voided
while intangible thought processes from discussion cannot be
reached .. ". ."I' The failure to construe this provision within
the context of the case before it left open the questions whether
the forfeiture provision of section 66.77 could be applied with-
out attempting to rule upon whether or not "actions" taken at
meetings in violation of this section were voidable and to what
extent a court would interpret the term "any action."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also considered the open
meeting law in State ex rel. Lynch v. Dancey ° and determined
that section 66.77 did not apply to proceedings of the Wisconsin
Judicial Commission. The Judicial Commission was created by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court as an agency of the judicial
branch2' to handle disciplinary matters involving the state's
judiciary. Confidential complaints alleging judicial
misconduct or disability are received and investigated by the
Commission. After formal charges are brought by the Commis-
sion against a judge, the proceedings, according to the Com-
mission's rules, become public.
On April 18, 1975, a meeting of the Commission was con-
vened to discuss both the complaints in a disciplinary matter
and the results of the investigation as to the charges against
Judge Richard Harvey, Jr. With seven of the nine Commission
members present the question of the issuance of a formal com-
17. Id.
18. Except as provided in sub. (4), all meetings of governmental bodies shall
be open sessions. No discussion of any matter shall be held and no action of any
kind, formal or informal, shall be introduced, deliberated upon, or adopted by
a governmental body in closed session, except as provided in sub. (4). Any action
taken at a meeting held in violation of this section shall be voidable. (Emphasis
added.)
19. 71 Wis. 2d at 680, 239 N.W.2d at 328.
20. 71 Wis. 2d 287, 238 N.W.2d 81 (1976).
21. Code of Judicial Ethics, 52 Wis. 2d vii (1972).
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plaint against Judge Harvey resulted in a four-to-three affirm-
ative vote. A public meeting was scheduled for July 25, 1975.
However, on the morning of the meeting the Commission dis-
covered a violation of rule 2(5) of the Judicial Committee Rules
of Procedure which required concurrence by five members of
the Commission to take valid action.23 Prior to convening the
public meeting, a secret executive session of eight members of
the Judicial Commission was held to reconsider the investiga-
tion results and other disciplinary data in light of the pre-
viously issued invalid complaint. The result of this closed
meeting was a valid complaint affirmed by a six-to-two vote.
The adoption of the Judicial Committee Rules of Proce-
dure 24 was found by the court to preempt any attempt to apply
the open meeting law. The rules" provide that following an
investigation and a determination of probable cause for the
filing of a formal charge or hearing, all proceedings shall be
public. The court found these rules to be at least as expansive
as those contained in section 66.77 and thus determined that
the rules of the Commission did no violence to the public policy
expressed in section 66.77(1).
Though the Wisconsin Supreme Court reached a different
result as to the application of the open meeting law in Dancey
than in Conta, the court did not consider its rationale contra-
dictory. In Dancey the open meeting law was found inapplica-
ble because of its conflict with the superintending power of the
supreme court as expressed in the Wisconsin Constitution."
The Wisconsin Judicial Commission was a governmental
body,2 created by the supreme court itself under its unequivo-
cal grant of power and superintending control over the state's
judiciary. In matters of ethical supervision and maintenance of
22. In the Matter of the Promulgation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, 52 Wis. 2d
vii, viii-xi (1972). See especially, Rules 8, 18 and 20.
23. 57 Wis. 2d vii, ix (1973).
24. 57 Wis. 2d vii (1973).
25. Rules 2 and 3, Judicial Committee Rules of Procedure, 57 Wis. 2d at viii-x.
26. 71 Wis. 2d at 294-96, 238 N.W.2d at 84. Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 3 provides:
The supreme court, except in cases otherwise provided in this constitution,
shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the state;
but in no case removed to the supreme court shall a trial by jury be allowed.
The supreme court shall have a general superintending control over all inferior
courts; it shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus,
injunction quo warranto, certiorari, and other original and remedial writs, and
to hear and determine the same.
27. For the definition of a "governmental body" see Wis. STAT. § 66.77(2)(c) (1973).
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standards for the judiciary the power of the state supreme court
is exclusive.3 "Although duly enacted legislation is ordinarily
effective as a constraint or guide on all branches of government,
it cannot overpower the express or implied applications of that
more fundamental law, the state constitution.""9
Assuming, arguendo, that section 66.77 was intended to
apply to proceedings of the Judicial Commission, the Wiscon-
sin court concluded, without serious question, the conduct of
the Commission's secret meeting came directly within the
scope of two exceptions to the open meeting law. 0 Those excep-
tions deal with a governmental body's right to convene in
closed session for the purpose of disciplinary matters. The mat-
ters which those exceptions exempt were the very matters con-
sidered by the Commission in its secret meeting.
H. FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
Recently in In re Hon. Charles Kading3' the Wisconsin Su--
preme Court was faced with the nature and scope of its supervi-
sory control over the state judiciary. At issue was whether the
supreme court had the power to adopt and enforce the Code of
Judicial Ethics.2 Special attention was directed to Rule 17,
which requires an annual financial report, listing the assets and
liabilities of each state judge, and property owned by the judge,
by his spouse or by his legal dependents. Judge Kading filed
28. 71 Wis. 2d at 295, 238 N.W.2d at 85.
29. 71 Wis. 2d at 699, 239 N.W.2d at 337.
30. Wis. STAT. § 66.77(4) (1973):
(4) A governmental body may convene in closed session for purposes of:
(b) Considering employment, dismissal, promotion, demotion, compensa-
tion, licensing or discipline of any public employe or person licensed by a state
board or commission or the investigation of charges against such person, unless
an open meeting is requested by the employe or person charged, investigated or
otherwise under discussion;
(e) Financial, medical, social or personal histories and disciplinary data
which may unduly damage reputations;
31. 70 Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409, 238 N.W.2d 63, 239 N.W.2d 297 (1975).
32. The Code of Judicial Ethics was adopted on November 14, 1967. In re Promul-
gation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d 252, 153 N.W.2d 873, 155 N.W.2d 565
(1967).
33. The code was amended by order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court on June 28,
1974, in order to add Rule 17. In the Matter of the Amendment of Code of Judicial
Ethics, 63 Wis. 2d vii (1974).
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his financial report and completed all items with the exception
of a disclosure of assets. In its place Judge Kading indicated
that he declined to furnish this information, but if he was as-
signed a case in which he might be prejudiced because of assets
owned by himself or his family, his situation would be fully
disclosed. The supreme court directed the Judicial Commis-
sion to investigate. A formal determination by the Commission
found that Judge Kading had not filed a completed financial
report and this constituted a violation of Rule 17. The commis-
sion further recommended that the supreme court take appro-
priate measures to insure compliance. The court sought com-
pliance from Judge Kading but he still refused based on a belief
that Rule 17 was unconstitutional. The supreme court subse-
quently ordered a hearing in which the court found it had au-
thority to adopt and enforce the Code of Judicial Ethics and
that Rule 17 was valid against all constitutional challenges.
Following a review of prior judicial statements concerning
inherent judicial power, the supreme court declared, "The
function of the judiciary is the administration of justice, and
this court, as the supreme court within a statewide system of
courts, has an inherent power to adopt those statewide mea-
sures which are absolutely essential to the due administration
of justice in the state. ' 34 The court concluded that the promul-
gations of the Code of Judicial Ethics with Rule 17 was such a
measure.
An additional source of authority for the court's power was
implied from the constitutional grant of supervisory control
contained in Article VII, section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion.- The court stated:
This power of superintending control is "unlimited in extent
... undefined in character ... [and] unsupplied with
means and instrumentalities." That this is "a clear, unequi-
vocal grant of power" has been recognized from the earliest
days of Wisconsin law. Mr. Justice ROUJET MARSHALL, after
a painstaking survey of this power concluded in 1908 that it
is "not limited other than by the necessities of justice" and
that it necessarily includes "all. . .means applicable thereto
and all power necessary to make such. . .means fully accept-
able for the purpose." The superintending power is as broad
34. 70 Wis. 2d at 518, 235 N.W.2d at 413.
35. See note 26 supra.
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and as flexible as necessary to insure the due administration
of justice in the courts of this state.36
The power to regulate judges in their judicial role was a
small logistic step from the constitutional grant of power over
all inferior courts and the power to regulate attorneys in the
practice of law.37 The court held that it possessed this addi-
tional power as part of an ongoing, continuing supervision in
response to changing needs and circumstances.
Erosion of confidence and respect for public officials were
factors cited to support the adoption of Rule 17 as a reasonable
response by the court to the maintenance and enhancement of
public confidence in the integrity of the courts of this state. 31
Though the dissent had agreed to the desirability of Rule 17,
it criticized the extent to which the majority went beyond
"'the ambit of the power of [the supreme court] to promul-
gate.' "3 Charging the court with legislating in promulgating
Rule 17, the dissent stated the majority's purpose was to ac-
complish indirectly what the constitution says it may not do
directly through the use of the sanctions of censure, reprimand
and contempt.
No explicit constitutional barrier exists for the imposition
of the lesser sanctions of censure, contempt and suspension,
though constitutional provisions for the removal" of a sitting
judge require that he be removed by the constitutional method.
In Kading, the Wisconsin court cited other jurisdictions which
had held that the state supreme court could impose sanctions
short of removal though there was a constitutional provision
vesting in the legislature the power to remove judges.4 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that in each case the court
involved based the decision upon "its responsibility as a consti-
tutionally charged superintendent and upon the proposition
that it was unsound jurisprudence to refuse to exercise judicial
36. 70 Wis. 2d at 519-20, 235 N.W.2d at 414 (footnotes omitted).
37. In re Integration of Bar, 273 Wis. 281, 77 N.W.2d 602, 79 N.W.2d 441; In re
Integration of Bar, 249 Wis. 523, 25 N.W.2d 500 (1946).
38. 70 Wis. 2d at 523-24, 235 N.W.2d at 416.
39. Id. 2d at 543, 235 N.W.2d at 426.
40. The constitutional means of removal are impeachment (WIs. CONST. art. VII,
§ 1), address (Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 13), and recall (WIs. CONST. art. XIII, § 12).
41. The court noted especially In re Mussman, 112 N.H. 99, , 289 A. 403, 405-
06 (1972) and Ransford v. Graham, 374 Mich. 104, -, 131 N.W.2d. 201, 202 (1964).
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power where there was an established need for it and no explicit
constitutional barrier to its exercise. '42
Rule 17 was further challenged by Judge Kading as an un-
constitutionally overbroad intrusion into his private economic
affairs. The court concluded that "it is extremely doubtful that
a public official has a fundamental constitutional right to eco-
nomic privacy," because the protected zone of privacy had
been limited to intimate personal and familial matters.13 Also
cited was the higher degree of scrutiny and exposure expected
of a public official as compared to a purely private individual. 4
Nor was Rule 17 found overbroad in requiring the disclosure of
all assets. An objective scheme of relevant and nonrelevant
judicial assets was deemed impossible. 5 The limiting provi-
sions of Rule 17 also precluded the court from finding the rule
suffered from overbreath.4 6 The weight of authority47 forced the
court's conclusion that full financial disclosure laws for public
officials were not unconstitutionally overbroad."
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The 1973 State legislature created the Wisconsin Solid
Waste Recycling Authority49 as a public body corporate and
politic with the authority to develop and coordinate all solid
waste recycling activities within specified recycling regions in
42. 70 Wis. 2d at 523, 235 N.W.2d at 416.
43. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
44. 70 Wis. 2d at 526, 235 N.W.2d at 417.
45. Id. at 527, 235 N.W.2d at 418.
46. In the Matter of the Amendment of Code of Judicial Ethics, 63 Wis. 2d vii
(1974):
17.
(b) The report shall be in a prescribed form and shall list; without dollar
value or quantity, all assets (for each asset having a total market value of $100
or more) except for household and personal effects, automobile, and recreational
equipment, and all liabilities together with the names of creditors, but without
dollar amount, provided however that liabilities need not include ordinary con-
sumer debts incurred in the normal course of an individual's personal affairs.
47. The Wisconsin court cited Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 Ill. 2d
512, 315 N.E.2d 9, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d
275, 517 P.2d 911, appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902 (1974); Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill. 2d
570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972), appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 925 (1973).
48. 70 Wis. 2d at 530, 235 N.W.2d at 419.
49. 1973 Wis. Laws ch. 305, creating Wis. STAT. ch. 499 (1973).
[Vol. 60:379
TERM OF THE COURT
the state. 0 The Authority was also empowered to incur debts
and issue notes and bonds to implement those activities. 51 Its
members were to be appointed by the governor with the advice
and consent of the senate." The operation of the Authority was
to serve the well-settled public purpose of promoting the
health, safety and welfare of state residents through the conser-
vation of energy and the protection and improvement of the
environment.
The Solid Waste Recycling Authority was created subse-
quent to the court's decision in State ex rel. Warren v.
Nusbaum 53 sustaining the constitutionality of the Wisconsin
Housing Finance Authority (HFA). The organization, powers
and limited discretion of the Authority are virtually the same
as the organization, powers and limited discretion of the HFA.
Like the HFA, it is a nonprofit, "public body corporate and
politic" created by the legislature to carry out public purposes,
which, by virtue of express language of the Act, cannot incur
state debt.
This controversy arose when the Authority requested the
Department of Administration to issue to it the $500,000 appro-
priation made by the legislature for initial operating expenses.
Secretary Anthony Earl refused based on his belief that the Act
was unconstitutional because it failed to serve a public and
state-wide purpose, illegally delegated legislative power, un-
lawfully attempted to control future legislative action, pro-
vided for unlawful state involvement in works of internal im-
provement, created a prohibited state debt, unlawfully ex-
empted Authority property from taxation, invaded municipal
rights of home rule, and vested overly-broad condemnation
powers in the Authority. In Wisconsin Solid Waste Recycling
Authority v. Earl54 the Wisconsin Supreme Court adjudged the
provisions of chapter 499, creating the Wisconsin Solid Waste
Recycling Authority, constitutional.
It is well established that the expenditure of public funds
50. Wis. STAT. §§ 499.02, 499.07, 499.10 (1973).
51. Wis. STAT. §§ 499.07(12), (13), (14), 499.25 (1973).
52. Wis. STAT. § 499.02 (1973)
53. 59 Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973). This case held that the legislation
creating the Housing Finance Authority, intended to assist in the financing of needed
housing facilities through existing channels of commerce, was a valid enactment.
54. 70 Wis. 2d 464, 235 N.W.2d 648 (1975).
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must be for public purposes only.55 In view of the nature and
provisions of the Act as spelled out in detail in section 1 of
chapter 305 of the Laws of 1973,6 the court found that the Act's
implementation would be for the public health, welfare, safety
and comfort of the people of the entire state.57
The court concluded that the issuance of bonds in accord-
ance with the directives of the Act would not constitute a state
debt or pledge of the state's credit in violation of the state
constitution. 58 The Act prohibited the Authority from incurring
such obligations on behalf of the state. 9 In reliance upon lan-
guage contained in Nusbaum an additional provision was in-
cluded in the Act placing a moral obligation upon the state
legislature to make up deficits with an "expectation and aspi-
ration" that the legislature would appropriate funds to meet
such deficits."
The court found that the tax exempt status granted to the
Authority encouraged the favorable sale of its bonds and fur-
ther aided in the accomplishment of the Act's public purpose
by reducing the Authority's capital needs,12 quoting Nusbaum
for the proposition that such an exemption is constitutional
where "(a)ny classification of taxation . . .has a reasonable
relation to a legitimate end of governmental action." 3
55. State ex rel. Hammerhill Paper Co. v. LaPlante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 47-48, 205
N.W.2d 784, 793-94 (1973).
56. [I]n establishing a Wisconsin solid waste recycling authority, the legis-
lature is acting in all respects for the benefit of the people of this state to serve
a public purpose in improving and otherwise promoting their health, welfare and
prosperity and that the. . . authority. . . is empowered to act on behalf of the
people of this state in serving this public purpose for the benefit of the general
public; and that it is a valid public purpose to assist local units of government
and the private solid waste management industry in providing the necessary
systems, facilities, technology and services for solid waste management and
resources recovery and to provide the necessary powers needed to accomplish
these public purposes.
See also Wis. STAT. § 499.03 (1973).
57. 70 Wis. 2d at 480, 235 N.W.2d at 658-59 (1975).
58. WIs. CONST. art. VIII §§ 3, 4, 7. 70 Wis. 2d at 482, 235 N.W.2d at 660 (1975).
59. Wis. STAT. § 499.31 (1973).
60. 59 Wis. 2d at 429-32, 208 N.W.2d at 803-05 (1973). In Nusbaum the court
construed the provisions of the Housing Finance Authority Act as constituting an
"expression of future intention or aspiration" and the subsequent amendment of the
act to include a "moral obligation" clause.
61. Wis. STAT. § 499.32(4) (1973).
62. 70 Wis. 2d at 483, 235 N.W.2d at 660, quoting State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum,
59 Wis. 2d 391, 438, 208 N.W.2d 780, 808 (1973).
63. Id.
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Since section 499.32(4) does not restrict the final delibera-
tions or actions of future legislatures, there is no unconstitu-
tional limitation of the powers of the legislature. 4 An aralogous
provision in the Housing Finance Act, as noted by the court,
was declared a nullity because it required the joint finance
committee to introduce in bill form without change in either
house the capital reserve fund appropriation recommended by
the governor."5 In the Solid Waste Authority Act there is no
limitation on changes in budget proposals nor upon the actions
of the executive. The secretary of administration, a
legislatively-created rather than constitutionally-mandated
office, was merely required to bring to the legislature's atten-
tion the operation of the Authority by including it in his budget
compilation.66
The dissent vigorously stressed that the creation of the Au-
thority constituted an act of internal improvement in violation
of Article VIII, section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution. It
posed the question whether the state could delegate the power
to a body such as the Authority to enable it to require
municipalities, private corporations and even individuals to
use its manufacturing facilities and still disavow the Author-
ity's existence as an agency or arm of the state.
No violation of the internal improvements clause was found
to exist. The court found that the Authority was an entity
independent from the state 8 and that the Act's one-time ap-
propriation of $500,000 was for initial operating, planning and
administration expenses, and not for building facilities. 9 The
rule recognized in Appeal of Van Dyke70 provided the court
with an additional basis for its conclusion. Van Dyke held that
if a law is predominantly public in its aim it will not be held
to violate the internal improvements provision in spite of the
fact that the state carries on internal improvements incident
64. 70 Wis. 2d at 487, 235 N.W.2d at 662 (1975).
65. Id.
66. 70 Wis. 2d at 486-87, 235 N.W.2d at 662 (1975).
67. This section provides in part: "The state shall never contract any debt for works
of internal improvement, or be a party in carrying on such works. .. ."
68. 70 Wis. 2d at 491, 235 N.W.2d at 664 (1975). The court supported its conclusion
by citing two Alabama decisions to the same effect: Knight v. West Ala. Environmen-
tal Improvement Auth., 287 Ala. 15, 246 So. 2d 903 (1971); Edmonson v. State Indus.
Dev. Auth., 279 Ala. 206, 184 So. 2d 903 (1966).
69. 70 Wis. 2d at 491-92, 235 N.W.2d at 664 (1975).
70. 217 Wis. 528, 259 N.W. 700 (1935).
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to the main public purpose of the law.7 The more recent deci-
sions of State ex rel. LaFollette v. Reuter" and Nusbaum
73
followed the same approach. In light of the internal improve-
ments prohibition of the Wisconsin Constitution, the court had
no trouble in determining that the dominant purpose of the Act
was the preservation of the health, safety and welfare of the
people of the state and any incidental internal improvements
were merely the physical means for achieving that purpose.
7
In responding to the challenge that the power delegated
under the act was excessive, the court pointed out that sections
499.167- and 499.10(5)76 placed the Authority's power within the
confines of the test set forth in Nusbaum: "The Authority is
not delegated the power to make law but to make factual deter-
minations in execution of the law as declared by the
legislature. ,77
Finally, the court found that the section of the Act provid-
ing that the Authority should not be terminated while it had
obligations outstanding78 did not place an invalid restriction on
the reserved power of the legislature to repeal enactments in
violation of the Wisconsin Constitution. 79 The court explained
that the reserved power clause was inapplicable to the Solid
Waste Act since section 1 of article XI is directed only to laws
enacted under its provisions. Since the Authority is not a cor-
poration in the normal sense, it was not created pursuant to the
reserved power clause.8 ° The state's involvement in solid waste
71. Id. at 544, 259 N.W. at 707 (1935).
72. 33 Wis. 2d 384, 147 N.W.2d 304 (1967). In this case the court held that since
water pollution was a matter of public health, a law which appropriated money for use
by other governmental entities in constructing water pollution abatement facilities did
not run afoul of the internal improvements prohibition.
73. Here, the construction of public housing was found not to be the ultimate
purpose. This case gave a broad interpretation to Van Dyke and used it to uphold the
Housing Finance Authority.
74. 70 Wis. 2d at 493-94, 235 N.W.2d at 665-66 (1975).
75. This section sets out the standards against which the Authority is to measure
the facts found at a hearing on required use.
76. This section gives criteria for the establishment of regional boundaries. The
regional system set up by the Act was further found not to be an unreasonable classifi-
cation of governmental subdivisions. 70 Wis. 2d at 497-98, 235 N.W.2d at 667 (1975).
See also Wis. STAT. §§ 499.11, 499.16 (1973).
77. 70 Wis. 2d at 496, 235 N.W.2d at 666 (1975), quoting State ex rel. Warren v.
Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 443, 208 N.W.2d 780, 810 (1973).
78. Wis. STAT. § 499.02(4) (1973).
79. 70 Wis. 2d at 498-99, 235 N.W.2d at 667-68 (1975). See also Wis. CONST. art.
XI, § 1.
80. Id. at 498, 235 N.W.2d at 667 (1975).
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management has been sharply debated. Critics maintain that
the state should stay out of the garbage business. Local govern-
ments lack sufficient funds and technical expertise to deal with
this ever-increasing problem. Establishment of the Solid Waste
Authority will facilitate cooperation with and aid to municipal-
ities by recognizing solid waste management as a unique and
serious problem.
DONALD J. WALL
MUNICIPAL LAW
I. CLAims AGAINST MUNICIPALITIES
A. Notice of Counterclaim
The Wisconsin court ruled in City of Milwaukee v. Milwau-
kee Civic Developments, Inc.' that section 62.25(1)2 of the Wis-
consin Statutes applies to counterclaims filed against a city
when the city has instituted the original action. Section
62.25(1) generally requires filing a notice of claim with the city
council as a condition precedent to recovery on the claim.
Subsection (a) states:
(a) No action shall be maintained against a city upon a
claim of any kind until the claimant shall first present his
claim to the council and it is disallowed in whole or in part.
Failure of the council to pass upon the claim within 90 days
after presentation is a disallowance.
The City of Milwaukee had commenced an action against
defendant Milwaukee Civic Developments, Inc. The defendant
interposed several counterclaims, but did not present the coun-
terclaims to the city council. The city asserted as a defense that
the condition of compliance with section 62.25(1) had not been
met. The circuit court upheld the city's position and dismissed
the counterclaim.
The supreme court affirmed. The defendant-appellant
argued that applying section 62.25(1) to counterclaims was not
in accord with the purpose of the statute, citing Patterman v.
City of Whitewater,3 which had stated that the claim presenta-
1. 71 Wis. 2d 647, 239 N.W.2d 44 (1976).
2. Wis. STAT. § 62.25(1) (1973).
3. 32 Wis. 2d 350, 145 N.W.2d 705 (1966).
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